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Current knowledge on the role of the Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Theory of Mind – a 
Commentary on Schurz and Tholen (2016) 
 
Schurz and Tholen (2016) argue that common approaches to studying the neural 
basis of “theory of mind” (ToM) obscure a potentially important role for inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) in managing conflict between perspectives, and urge new work to 
address this question: “to gain a full understanding of the IFG's role in ToM, we 
encourage future imaging studies to use a wider range of control conditions.” 
(p332). We wholeheartedly agree, but note that this observation has been made 
before, and has already led to a programme of work that provides evidence from 
fMRI, EEG, and TMS on the role of IFG in managing conflict between self and other 
perspectives in ToM. We highlight these works, and in particular we demonstrate 
how careful manipulation within ToM tasks has been used to act as an internal 
control condition, wherein conflict has been manipulated within-subject. We further 
add to the discussion by framing key questions that remain regarding IFG in the 
context of these. Using limitations in the existing research, we outline how best 
researchers can proceed with the challenge set by Schurz and Tholen (2016). 
 
 
Theory of Mind and cognitive control 
Children’s and adults’ success at reasoning about the beliefs, desires and intentions 
of others – an ability termed “theory of mind” or “mindreading” – is associated with 
performance on tests of cognitive control (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & 
Breton, 2002; Devine & Hughes, 2014; German & Hehman, 2006). It is commonly 
proposed that one reason for this is that cognitive control is necessary to overcome 
interference from one’s own “egocentric” or “self” perspective, when judging the 
perspectives of others. In light of such behavioural results, it is striking that 
neuroimaging work on ToM often describes the core “social brain” network as 
comprising the temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, but not brain 
regions associated with cognitive control, such as the inferior frontal cortex. Indeed, 
the review presented in Schurz and Tholen (2016), and two recent quantitative 
reviews, are inconsistent regarding the presence of activations in IFG in ToM tasks 
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(Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, 
Richlan, & Perner, 2014). Schurz and Tholen (2016) rightly suggest that this may be 
because frequently-used paradigms aim to identify the neural correlates of ToM (in 
particular reasoning about false beliefs) by subtracting out baseline conditions that 
require closely-matched reasoning about non-social situations (perhaps most 
notably, reasoning about false photographs (for a typical example, see Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003)). While this approach is vital for identifying brain regions that 
might be domain-specific to ToM, it risks subtracting out functionally critical 
processes that are shared with other tasks (e.g., Apperly, 2011, 2013), including 
cognitive control processes. While questions about domain-specificity for ToM have 
had most prominence in the literature in the past 15 years, a growing number of 
more recent studies suggest that this approach misses critical information about the 
functional and neural basis of ToM. Consequently, though quantitative brain-based 
meta-analyses are informative, they are necessarily constrained by the prevalent 
methods in the prior literature, and the brain regions that are modulated as a result 
of those paradigmatic choices. Thus, where current meta analyses appear to indicate 
that IFG is only recruited for certain ToM tasks, this cannot be determined with any 
certainty due to the relative lack of published work that seeks to specifically 
manipulate cognitive control in ToM.  
 
One of the approaches used to examine cognitive control in ToM has manipulated 
the salience of the participant’s own perspective, while they were engaged in 
reasoning about the false beliefs or differing visual perspectives of others (e.g., 
Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen, 2015; van der Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, 
& Aleman, 2011; Vogeley et al., 2001). For example, Vogeley et al. (2001) found 
greater activation in right IFG when participants reasoned about others’ mental 
states in a story scenario in which they themselves also featured, compared with a 
story in which they did not. Other relevant studies have found varying activation in 
IFG when they manipulated whether the perspective of the social target is congruent 
with the participant’s (e.g., because they have a true belief, or see the same number 
of objects) or incongruent with the participant’s (e.g., because they have a false 
belief, or see a different number of objects; e.g., Abraham, Rakoczy, Werning, von 
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Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & Apperly, 2011; 
Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Rothmayr et al., 2011). 
 
While IFG is associated with a variety of functions (see Liakakis, Nickel, & Seitz, 2011 
for a meta-analysis) support for interpreting the above results in terms of inhibitory 
control comes from studies that included an independent inhibitory control task, and 
found that activity in IFG during the inhibitory control task overlapped with activity 
during the relevant ToM contrast (e.g., Rothmayr et al., 2011; Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 
2006; van der Meer et al., 2011). These findings converge with evidence from a 
patient with right frontal brain injury (including damage to IFG), who showed 
significant impairments to inhibitory control, and showed strong egocentric biases 
on a range of ToM tasks (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005; 
Samson, Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015).  
 
Distinguishing self-perspective inhibition from generic cognitive control 
While the abovementioned studies all provide evidence that IFG may be involved in 
resisting interference from participants’ “self” perspective or knowledge of reality 
during ToM, they are also to varying degrees consistent with a less interesting 
possibility that cognitive control processes are simply recruited in task conditions 
that are more challenging for participants to perform. Several recent studies, 
however, provide stronger evidence that self-perspective inhibition is not merely a 
confound in existing tasks, but that it is an integral component of thinking about 
alternative perspectives. 
 
In Hartwright, Apperly, and Hansen (2012), participants undertook a ToM task that 
orthogonally manipulated whether the social target’s belief about an object’s 
location was true or false, and whether their desire for the object was positive or 
negative (they liked or disliked it). Critically, both the belief and desire factors 
affected task difficulty, but only the belief factor resulted in systematic differences 
between the participants’ and target’s perspectives. Thus, while both factors might 
recruit cognitive control processes to meet generic task demands, only the belief 
factor should recruit control processes associated with self-perspective inhibition. 
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Consistent with this distinction, both belief and desire factors modulated neural 
activity in anterior cingulate cortex, while only the belief factor modulated activity in 
vlPFC, specifically bilateral IFG. This result suggests that IFG is specifically responsive 
to the need for self-perspective inhibition, and not generic task demands.  
 
 In later work, we sought to evaluate self-perspective inhibition in mental- versus 
non mental-representation (Hartwright et al., 2015). By adapting the ToM localizer 
vignettes from Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), we developed a series of high and low 
salience of self-perspective scenarios, for both mental and non-mental 
representation. This factorial design enabled us to identify the neural correlates 
associated with representational content (mental-representation, e.g., false belief, 
versus non mental-representation, e.g., false photograph), self-perspective inhibition 
(high versus low salience of self-perspective), and the interaction between these. 
These data indicated an interaction in left IFG, where this region was modulated by 
salience in belief reasoning only (with greater activation for high salience of self-
perspective) suggesting additional processing specific to ToM in the case where own 
perspective was highly salient and, thus, required inhibition.  
 
Two studies provide critical evidence on the causal role of IFG in self-perspective 
inhibition. First, the recent neuropsychological study by Samson et al. (2015) 
(referred to by Schurz and Tholen (2016)) demonstrated a double-dissociation 
between impaired self-perspective inhibition and impaired reasoning about 
participants’ own negative versus positive desires, with right IFG being one of the 
unique areas of overlap in the lesions of the two patients with impaired self-
perspective inhibition. Second, based on our paradigm in Hartwright et al. (2012), we 
used neuro-navigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to demonstrate that 
stimulation of the right vlPFC affected participants’ predictions according to others’ 
false beliefs (where self-perspective inhibition is required), whilst no such influence 
was seen for desires (where there was no perspective conflict).  Notably, the 
morphology of right vlPFC and TPJ were relevant to the direction of the influence of 
TMS (see Hartwright, Hardwick, Apperly, & Hansen, 2016).  
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Further questions regarding the Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Theory of Mind 
The evidence reviewed supports the view that IFG is relevant for ToM in managing 
conflict between perspectives. Of course, in the wider literature right IFG associated 
with the suppression of irrelevant information – acting as a ‘brake’ – whereas the 
left IFG is suggested to support the controlled retrieval of information (Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004, 2014; Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 
2005; Badre & Wagner, 2007). It is likely that both the left and right IFG are relevant 
for ToM, but that they serve a different role in managing perspective difference. It 
remains unclear whether they show any domain-specific specialisation for these 
purposes.  
 
Further investigation is warranted to test whether IFG is involved in inhibiting self-
perspective, or instead managing conflict between perspectives, and that the same 
process is recruited when it is the other person’s perspective that must be inhibited 
(McCleery et al., 2011; Ramsey et al., 2013). Still, it has not been established 
whether the effects discussed here are particular to conflicting self- and other-
perspectives – the participant’s own knowledge state and the target agent’s [false] 
belief (thus requiring ‘self-perspective inhibition’) – or whether conflicting other-
other or self-self perspectives would be sufficient. For example, it is possible for a 
participant to know that two people have opposing beliefs – e.g., about the contents 
of a box – but not to know whether either belief is true. Likewise, some 
circumstances require the participant to hold in mind both their own current 
perspective and their own conflicting past, future or counterfactual perspective – 
e.g., “Had I known it would rain I would have brought an umbrella”. Will IFG be 
equally important in resolving such conflicting perspectives? 
 
 More broadly, what also remains unclear is how IFG – which is a large anatomical 
region – might be divided functionally in supporting ToM. Schurz and Tholen (2016) 
allude to a possible division where more dorsal parts of IFG support mirroring, due 
to activations in this region being identified in affective ToM tasks, whereas more 
ventral IFG might support cognitive ToM, in terms of self-perspective inhibition. 
Nonetheless, more fine-grained work needs to be conducted in order to fully 
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disambiguate the circumstances under which IFG is engaged, and more precisely 
how its functions are organised in ToM.  
 
There are two notable challenges to determining whether IFG is inhibiting self-
perspective, or managing conflict between perspectives . First, little is understood 
about the time-course of ToM. McCleery et al. (2011) provide EEG evidence that 
inconsistency between visual perspectives is managed by a late component in the 
right lateral prefrontal cortex, and that this process occurs after perspectives have 
been calculated. It is not yet clear, however, whether visual perspective taking and 
mental-state representation follow identical neural computations, and limited 
agreement in paradigmatic focus across the two areas of research makes this 
difficult to infer on the basis of existing studies (Schurz et al., 2015). A better 
understanding of the temporal course of ToM would facilitate more powerful 
neuroimaging paradigms, wherein timing information can be accommodated within 
modelling of brain responses. A second difficulty is that parts of the IFG are known to 
support language. Many of the prior ToM tasks involve written language or would 
likely engage subvocalizing. Criticisms have been raised suggesting that some prior 
ToM experimental manipulations do not balance language differences between 
conditions (Callejas, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2011; see also Hartwright et al., 2015 for 
further discussion). It is therefore important to avoid systematic biases that would 
also modulate language areas. Still, this is not straightforward. Language relating to 
unobservable mental phenomena is likely to reflect more complex syntax, where the 
interpretation of semantic information may be more varied. On this basis, the widely 
used false-belief and false-photograph comparison has been suggested to be 
suboptimal. Only the representational content of one of these scenarios – the 
misinformed belief – is technically false: a photograph, even if the scene changes 
immediately after its acquisition, is an accurate representation of the moment in 
time that it depicts (Perner & Leekam, 2008). This is a matter of individual construal, 
but one that may introduce bias nonetheless.    
 
In sum, there are a number of imaging studies that indicate that IFG is a reliable 
correlate of a key component of ToM – managing conflict between perspectives. 
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Lesion studies (Samson et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015) and our recent TMS study 
(Hartwright et al., 2016) provide pivotal evidence for a causal role when mentalizing 
in the presence of competing perspectives. More work is required to elucidate the 
specificity and timing of IFG’s function, as well as detailed functional architecture of 
IFG, in representational tasks.    
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